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Abstract 
The US shale industry turned the world-wide energy landscape upside down in less than 
a decade and put the US (back) atop the global energy hierarchy. At the beginning of 2020, the 
Covid-19 pandemic shocked the global energy markets and led to an unprecedented economic 
downturn. US shale oil & gas demand plummeted, prices collapsed, and bankruptcies were 
announced at exceptional rates. This paper aims to assess the impact of the virus and its 
repercussions on US unconventionals. For that, this study focuses on six central drivers highly 
relevant for the industry and its future viability. These are: First, crude oil and natural gas 
prices. Second, Break-Even (BE) prices for fracking operations. Third, financial and technical 
constraints within the industry. Fourth, global hydrocarbon demand development. Fifth, 
political and regulatory factors in the US. Sixth, environmental and societal sustainability. 
Those drivers were initially assessed through a literature review whose results were then 
examined by an expert survey. It was comprised of 83 senior professionals from various 
backgrounds engaged with the US shale industry. From a synthesis of both examinations, the 
results show that some drivers, in particular demand and commodity prices, are shaping the 
industry’s future more distinctly than others. It further seems that while those drivers are also 
impacted substantially by the pandemic, they positively influence the future of the industry. In 
contrast to the literature review, the survey also revealed that most experts expect the industry 
to recover to pre-Covid-19 levels. While these results are quite noteworthy, uncertainty 
displays a thread throughout this assessment. The future US and global energy landscape 
projection is extremely complex, and its drivers are interconnected. Therefore, this study aims 
to highlight some basic considerations regarding the forces at work while considering that some 
future implications can change the picture fundamentally - just like Covid-19 itself did. 
Project Mentor and Primary Reader: Reed Blakemore 
Academic Advisor and Secondary Reader: Professor Dan Zachary  
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At the beginning of the century, experts forecasted a dead-end for unconventionals and 
considered the US doomed to be dependent on foreign hydrocarbons, in particular gas, for a 
very long time (FERC, 2003). Only two decades later, the same country became a net exporter 
of energy (EIA, 2020b). Never has US natural gas production and consumption been as high 
as in 2019 (EIA, 2020a). At the same time, its reserves are considered to last for at least another 
100 years (Sutton et al., 2010). Being the world’s largest oil producer (IEA, 2020b), “project 
independence”1 finally became a reality. Oil & gas from shale formations disrupted the global 
energy landscape and turned out to be the most immense energy innovation in this century so 
far (Yergin, 2020). Until early 2020, the US shale industry’s evolution was an almost perfect 
success story prima facie. Then came March 2020. 
Just before Covid-19 spread through the continents, crude oil supply boomed (by then 
mainly driven by Russia, Saudi Arabia, and US shale, particularly from Texas). 
Simultaneously, demand, which was relatively inelastic before, collapsed as rapidly as the 
world’s economies. West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the crude most US companies are heavily 
dependent on, fell by more than 50% in March. It later went negative for the first time in history 
(EIA, 2020f). Since then, US shale companies’ revenues have decreased by more than 60% 
from the prior quarter (Williams-Derry et al., 2020). In the first half of 2020, the number of US 
oil & gas rigs, which is a barometer for industry vigor, almost split itself into thirds (Baker 
Hughes, 2020). While half of the US shale companies are under significant insolvency risk 
(Dickson et al., 2020), more than 200 already filed for bankruptcy (Haynes and Boone LLP, 
2020) which underlines the industry´s financial challenges. The IEA suggests that it will take 
 
1 “Project Independence” was a policy goal announced by President Nixon in the 1970s as a reaction to the oil 
crisis at that time. It aimed at the US being independent of other countries to cover its energy demand but was 
never reached (and some still doubt if it really was) until 2019.  
 
  2 
years until global demand recovers to pre-crisis levels – if it will ever reach that high again 
(IEA, 2020b). Even though any future developments in the time of a global pandemic are highly 
uncertain, one thing already seems to be clear: Covid-19 has had an enormous and 
unprecedented impact on the industry. This work aims to have a closer look at what this impact 
looks like in detail and its consequences for its future.   
Based on the fundamental literature on shale (Amongst others: Gao & You, 2017; IEA, 
2019, 2020b; Mehany & Guggemos, 2015; Wang, Chen, Jha, & Rogers, 2014), six key drivers 
that are decisive for the future of the US shale industry stand out: First, crude oil and natural 
gas prices. Second, Break-Even (BE) prices for fracking operations. Third, financial and 
technical constraints within the industry (e.g., debt ratios, capital spending, competition). 
Fourth, global hydrocarbon demand development. Fifth, political and regulatory factors in the 
US. Sixth, environmental and societal sustainability. The assessment of these factors as 
indicators for the state and US shale industry’s future begins with a concise literature review. 
From that review, two central hypotheses are derived: First, the impact of Covid-19 for the 
industry is negative. Second, 2019 was an all-time industry high in terms of activity and 
production not to be reached again. These hypotheses are then examined (verified or falsified) 
through an expert survey whose methodology and results are discussed subsequently. This 
work will close with a discussion section, followed by a conclusion.   
2. Literature Review 
Due to the fast-moving nature of many of the trends presented subsequently, not only 
scientific literature but also various publications from other, non-peer-reviewed sources will 
be utilized. The succeeding literature review closely examines the six central drivers presented 
in the introduction. Its key mechanisms, as well as its repercussions pre- and post-Covid-19 
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are stated in detail for every driver and then summarized. Derived from that, the following two 
hypotheses are generated:  
H1: The impact of Covid-19 for the industry is negative 
H2: 2019 was an all-time industry high in terms of activity and production not to be reached 
again 
2.1. Crude oil and gas prices 
The prices for crude oil & gas2 are essential for the shale industry. Based on the BE for 
fracking operations (discussed in 2.2), they decide about such projects’ economic viability. 
Both, being commodities traded globally, are principally depending on the global mechanisms 
of supply and demand. After 2008, gas prices started to decouple from crude oil and did not 
necessarily go parallel anymore (Aiube et al., 2017). Their relationship became more indirect 
and variances for one commodity price are not necessarily translated into the other (Hartley & 
Medlock, 2014). Although, crude oil prices still exert a prominent influence on those of natural 
gas (Brown & Yucel, 2008). That is particularly true during price shocks (Jadidzadeh & 
Serletis, 2017) and still very applicable in the States since a lot of US oil originates in Natural 
Gas Liquids (NGL). Although, still being the world’s central commodity, oil price parameters 
go beyond the traditional steering through supply and demand and also reflect a great variety 
of additional factors (Kallis & Sager, 2017; Kilian, 2009; Lumsdaine & Papell, 1997; Rapaport, 
2012). That is even more true in the times of a pandemic (Mensi et al., 2020). These factors 
need to be taken into account when discussing future prices and therefore are included 
subsequently. 
 
2 References to prices relate to WTI for oil and Henry Hub for natural gas. Those linkages are used throughout 
the entire work.  
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The concept of “peak oil” is more and more replaced by the state of “energy abundance” 
(Van de Graaf & Sovacool, 2020). Supply skyrocketed pre-Covid-19 (IEA, 2019). Low prices 
in April and May 2020 also occurred due to oversupply: OPEC+ did not manage to agree on 
cuts, which led to producers upscaling their volumes. With the oil revenues crucial for many 
state budgets, several nations could not and still cannot afford shutting down production even 
further, especially since other income sources are affected by Covid-19 as well. The same 
applies to many privately-owned companies that, facing financial hardship in the times of a 
global pandemic, need to keep operations going to cover their fixed costs. Such excess supply 
could keep prices low (Fitch Ratings Ltd., 2020; Guliyev, 2020). The pandemic itself imposes 
adverse effects on oil prices (Mohammed & Barrales-Ruiz, 2020). 
On the contrary, 81% of global wells are already in decline, and without US shale, currently 
making up around 8% of the global oil output, vast supply gaps would occur rapidly (Michaux, 
2019). The pandemic put many operators out of business and made outages peak in the first 
half of 2020 (EIA, 2020f). Consolidation could decrease volumes for a longer period (Avraam 
et al., 2020; Liu & Li, 2018). Still, supply is rather going to increase slightly within the next 
years (Rystad Energy, 2020) in order to catch up with global demand (discussed closer in 2.4), 
which plummeted in the first half of 2020 for oil. Gas remained more stable (EIA, 2020e), 
although it was hit hard by the pandemic-caused economic decline. Even though the energy 
transition will diminish demand, it will probably increase from a medium-term perspective 
with the transition fuel natural gas clearly advantaged (IEA, 2020b). That could lead to a more 
stable price plateau within the next years.  
Oil prices dropping from just about $60/bbl at the beginning of 2020 could average around 
$35/bbl this year and increase to $45/bbl in 2021 (Fitch Ratings Ltd., 2020). Almost half of the 
executives interviewed in the Dallas Fed (2020) Energy Survey expect the year to end with 
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prices of $40/bbl – $60/bbl. Rystad Energy (2020) expects $60/bbl as a long-term equilibrium 
with prices gradually increasing within the next years. Jefferson (2020) considers an increase 
to a range from $40/bbl – $60/bbl as feasible. As of late fall 2020, prices headed into that 
corridor with listings well above $40//bbl. While natural gas prices did not necessarily support 
a struggling industry when the Covid-19 effects took place, prices are more likely to go up 
heading into 2021 (EIA, 2020f) and in the medium to long-term (Dickson et al., 2020; Habrich-
Böcker et al., 2015). All these assumptions are being made under “normal” conditions of linear 
market movements.  
A key acknowledgement is that volatility increases even though prices will probably go up 
again in the medium-term. What Covid-19 proved is that such normal conditions of linear 
supply and demand curves barely exist anymore. No one saw the pandemic coming. However, 
even without shocks by singular events, markets are increasingly volatile (Michaux, 2019; Van 
de Graaf & Sovacool, 2020) and can already observed to be. Up- and down-cycle frequency is 
increasing (Rystad Energy, 2020). For instance, oil markets had to face three major price 
shocks within the last 12 years, on average, every five years. 
In such an environment, additional parameters are becoming increasingly important 
(Bhattacharyya, 2011):  How is OPEC (+), and more importantly, how are the big three 
(Yergin, 2020) Russia, USA, and Saudi Arabia regulating supply? Will Saudi Arabia be willing 
to be the global swing producer in the future? How are geopolitics evolving? How does (global) 
storage facility develop in order to balance fluctuation? How are investments into gas 
infrastructure evolving? As Jefferson (2020, p.2) emphasizes, the above explanations are “no 
attempt to prophesy or forecast, but simply to indicate some forces at work and guesses as to 
where they might lead”. Covid-19 fostered two trends: Even though prices will recover in the 
medium-term, a fast rebound of energy prices is unlikely even in the post-pandemic era 
(Grigas, 2017). Moreover, volatility increases even though prices will probably rise again in 
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the medium-term. Both apply to a greater extent for oil than for gas. Nevertheless, these 
developments do not necessarily display a strong future price foundation for the shale industry 
as a whole.  
2.2. Global hydrocarbon demand development 
For the substantial drop in crude oil prices in spring 2020, two major factors came together. 
One was, as discussed in 2.1, oversupply. It was accompanied by plunges in global demand as 
the world economy shut down. While global crude oil demand declined by roughly 30% in the 
first half of 2020 (IEA, 2020b), some products were carried down by that and then impacted 
even harder. Gasoline demand fell by 50% in the US and by 65% in Europe (EIA, 2020a).  
Natural gas demand, mainly utilized in more crisis-resilient sectors like heating or 
residential electricity, remained more stable and is expected to go down by 3% in 2020 (IEA, 
2020b). That is also based on the relatively low price plateau natural gas touched prior to 2020 
due to oversupply of this global commodity. Nevertheless, US industrial gas demand is likely 
to decrease by 20 % in 2020 (EIA, 2020c).  
Global demand development is very challenging to forecast due to the many uncertain 
future factors to predict. In most scenarios, global oil demand will increase over the next decade 
but peak somewhere between mid-2020 and 2040 (BP p.l.c., 2020; EIA, 2020a; IEA, 2020b; 
Tsoskounoglou et al., 2008). Natural gas, fueling the energy (or low carbon) transition, will be 
needed for a much longer time, and capacity will be added at considerable rates in the short-
term (EIA, 2020a). However, vast gaps exist between the different scenarios (BP p.l.c., 2020). 
Depending on the pace of the global low-carbon transition and regulatory policies, natural gas 
demand in 2050 could be twice as big in a “business as usual” in comparison to a “net zero” 
scenario (BP p.l.c., 2020).  Vehicle Miles traveled (VMT) in the US collapsed by more than 
half, in some places in the world, almost minus 75% by late spring 2020 (Highway & 
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Administration, 2020; Statista, 2020; Tomer & Fishbane, 2020). Even though traffic recovered 
recently, VMTs will be 20% lower than in 2019 (Highway & Administration, 2020). The 
aviation industry is hit even harder: For 2020, global enplanement numbers are expected to fall 
by 55% to pre-year, while recovery to pre-crisis levels will take until 2024, according to the 
IATA (2020). US refinery output was down by 20% pre-year (EIA, 2020d), which points at 
the fuels affected most by the pandemic: jet and gasoline (Larsen et al., 2020), which account 
for almost 60% of accumulated demand (Jefferson, 2020). Even though it should be mentioned 
that US domestic demand is only partly affected by that tendency since the US refinery system 
relies on heavier crudes. Well above 50 % of heavy crudes e.g., from Saudi Arabia, are 
imported (EIA, 2020a) and US refineries only partly can work with domestic, lighter crudes. 
Therefore, global demand for US exported crudes is a slightly more demand-driving factor 
here.  
Oil is a key resource for civilization because the transportation sector, which is vital for 
every other sector from food supply to industry, depends almost entirely upon it (McNally, 
2017). Although the same sector is the one most affected by Covid-19 (IEA, 2020b). The world 
could get used to a “new normal” that is shaped by remote work, localized or disrupted supply 
chains, regionalization, lower levels of international trade, greater reliance on digital channels, 
and even the return of borders (Brakman et al., 2020; Dickson et al., 2020; McKinsey & 
Company, 2020). These trends hurt the transportation sector and lessen its oil demand. For 
instance, one-third of all workers switched to remote work by late spring 2020 (Brynjolfsson 
et al., 2020), and almost half of US jobs could be done remotely (Dey et al., 2020). Even though 
oil is not substitutable (Löschel et al., 2020), future disruptions in transportation like the 
increase in ride-sharing and EVs could hurt demand even further.  
Nevertheless, these predictions are characterized by enormous uncertainty, and a whole 
variety of factors can be applied to either foster or harm future demand (IEA, 2020b). Although 
 
  8 
oil demand is not expected to return to pre-pandemic levels anytime soon, in most future 
scenarios, it is going to recover (BP p.l.c., 2020; Crooks et al., 2020). However, so will gas. 
Oil’s abrupt fall has narrowed the oil-to-gas price ratio from 50 in 2012 to less than 10 in April 
2020 (Dickson et al., 2020; EIA, 2020f). Heightening volatility in the oil market, relative 
stability due to heating, industrial usage and fueling the intensifying electrification of the 
energy sector, as well as a projected fall in associated gas production due to the cut in oil 
drilling, will strengthen natural gas demand (BP p.l.c., 2020; Dickson et al., 2020; IEA, 2020b). 
Since conventional sources will hardly satisfy future demands (IEA, 2020b; Melikoglu, 2014), 
the Covid-19 might turn out to have strengthened the case for US shale gas from a medium to 
long-term perspective. Gas was less affected by Covid-19, and the pandemic therefore 
accelerated a trend that already was described as the “New Fuel Order”: Natural gas’ rise to 
become the number one fossil fuel.  
2.3. BE prices for fracking operations  
BE prices for fracking operations are, in interplay with the market prices discussed in 2.1, 
decisive for such projects' economic (and in particular financial) viability. They determine both 
the competitiveness of shale projects as well as their Return On Investment (ROI) and therewith 
the attractiveness for investors. In recent years, shale has become increasingly competitive and 
the industry adapted to the drop in oil prices around 2014. They grew leaner and decreased 
their BEs through technology enhancements, improved well output and cost reductions. 
Technology breakthroughs like big well drilling or “walking drill rigs” have continuously 
improved efficiency and grew sourcing rates by double-digit numbers (Konduc et al., 2020; 
Wethe, 2015). On the other hand, major challenges remained. The output of a fracked well 
decreases steeply after year one, sometimes as much as 50%. Therefore, companies need to 
add new wells frequently to ensure sufficient productivity, which is more cost-intensive. Many 
older assets generate lower outputs than expected if put close together, known as the “Parent-
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Child-well problem”. Therefore, wells are dug further apart, leading to fewer total wells and 
lower outputs, which often leads to write offs in the books (Rafiee & Grover, 2017). Those 
asset write downs are one of the main reasons why the industry reported net losses of $6.7bn 
in 2019 (Williams-Derry et al., 2020).  
Today, shale gas has unlocked abundant resources at BE of less than $2.5/MMBtu to 
$3.0/MMBtu (Barbosa et al., 2020) and is considered to be ahead of shale oil in terms of cost 
discipline and competitiveness what also led to lower decline rates (SailingStone Capital 
Partners, 2020). US shale oil breaks even at around about $50/bbl for new wells on average 
(Dallas Fed, 2020; Dickson et al., 2020), while the number is roughly half of that for existing 
operations (Dallas Fed, 2020). However, the variance in BEs through different geologies and 
regions can be substantial (Dallas Fed, 2020). Hydrocarbons from the Permian are more 
competitive than those from Bakken, which means that the dynamics described in this chapter 
apply even more for products and companies originating in the latter. Figure 1 gives an 
overview of the BE costs of the one-hundred largest shale companies (oil) in the US.  
The intense, immediate effect of Covid-19 on prices discussed in 2.1 exerts pressure on 
producers to become leaner and more efficient in order to be able to withstand even lower 
prices (Scholl, 2019). With current price levels of shale oil just above $40/bbl, most producers 
do not necessarily break-even but could continue operations for multiple years (Dallas Fed, 
2020). Those who will not be able to do so could become victims of a major market 
consolidation (Dickson et al., 2020; Scholl, 2019). As the number of Mergers and Acquisitions 
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Figure 1 - BE costs of the 100 largest fracking companies in the US 
 
Source: Rystad Energy, Dallas Fed 
 
2.4. Financial and technical constraints within the industry  
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit the industry, financial and technical strains were 
on the rise. By 2025, the industry is expected to have accumulated $86bn in debt with net 
negative free cash flows of more than $300bn since 2012 (Alam & Wood, 2020; Dickson et 
al., 2020). Outstanding liabilities and dependence on venture capital are an issue. Even prior to 
2020, oil & gas companies underperformed the market, in parts because the focus was on 
growth and securing market share (Barbosa et al., 2020; Dallas Fed, 2020). Even in an 
increased price scenario of $50 -$60/bbl, only a few companies were profitable recently 
(McLean, 2018). In the price scenarios described in 2.1 and 2.2, only 25%-50% of producers 
will remain solvent (Dickson et al., 2020).  
The corresponding risk premiums increase (Aiube et al., 2017; Teti et al., 2020). Covid-19 
put investments on hold and forced investors even further to take on a long-term perspective 
(McKinsey & Company, 2020), which fostered uncertainty regarding the industry’s future 
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path. The IEA (2020b) estimates that US shale will suffer a 50% decline in investment activity 
in 2020 since investors are hesitant to fund further ventures in low price environments. While 
it is expected that investments in hydrocarbons decline in the times of price shocks (Bjørnland 
& Zhulanova, 2019), the hundreds of bankruptcies appearing in the last years (Dickson et al., 
2020; Haynes and Boone LLP, 2020), volatile markets, and a lack of reasonable returns for 
investors (Williams-Derry et al., 2020) make investments less attractive in a time when needed 
most. Declining Capex and plunging market capitalization make it even harder for struggling 
companies to pay off their debts and could lead to additional bankruptcies (Williams-Derry et 
al., 2020).  
It is crucial for shale companies to increase their focus on profitability to ensure a sufficient 
stream of investor money in the future. That is particularly true for pension funds and other 
institutional investors searching for suitable investment targets in a decade of low-interest rates 
but might review their strategies in the uncertain post-Covid-19 era. Major international oil 
companies (IOC) like Chevron and Exxon entered the market recently, which put operations 
on a firmer foundation and enabled entities to also get through periods of market hardship 
(Scholl, 2019). Nevertheless, increased competition and investor skepticism will probably 
shape the next years in the US shale industry.   
So will the number of bankruptcies. More than 200 shale producers already filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy (also known as reorganization bankruptcy) (Haynes and Boone LLP, 
2020), among them significant players like Chesapeake Energy, once a S&P 500 company. 
More than half of the current shale oil companies are at risk (Dickson et al., 2020) to suffer the 
same fate. While this is a harmful development leading to business closures and worker layoffs 
in the short term, it could strengthen the industry from a medium perspective, sparing only 
those who own healthy operations and financials. Indeed, looking at the US oil & gas rig count, 
which can be interpreted as a predictor for future output, two things stand out: The decline 
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followed after the 2014 price drop was much steeper, even though it occurred over a more 
extended period (Baker Hughes, 2020). Second, the number of new wells targeted increased 
slightly recently (Baker Hughes, 2020) while the output of both shale oil and gas recovered in 
fall 2020 (EIA, 2020f).  
Therefore, it is doubtful that the consolidation process is already completed. Still, many 
operators state growth and new wells as their top priority instead of consolidating their 
business, which partly led to the pre-Covid-19 oversupply (Dallas Fed, 2020). Figure 2 displays 
the US rig count for the last two decades.  
 
Figure 2 – Total number of US oil & gas rigs from 2000 to present 
 
Source: Baker Hughes 
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Moreover, chapter 11 bankruptcy does not remove players (and volumes) from the market 
for long. That results in the assumption that market consolidation is likely going to continue, 
burdening many operators, especially smaller independent ones (Scholl, 2019). From a 
medium-term perspective, this could decrease BEs, which would benefit the industry that is 
currently disadvantaged at low-price periods compared to other hydrocarbon developments 
(Rystad Energy, 2019). This might partly be balanced out by the short cycle character shale 
has compared to other projects, e.g., offshore and applies particularly to companies with low 
adjustment costs (Foroni & Stracca, 2019). 
2.5. Political and regulatory factors in the US 
The political repercussions of the US shale boom were extensive. First of all, being the 
world’s biggest hydrocarbon producer and a net exporter of energy (IEA, 2020b) is a 
substantial achievement in foreign policy and diplomatic freedom. Energy independence is a 
huge political capital and will shape US policies (e.g. Nordstream 2 or the Iran sanctions) and 
entire world regions (e.g., the Middle East) dramatically. Moreover, shale’s economic impact 
was vast. It reduced the US trade deficit by more than $200bn (Witte et al., 2018) and addressed 
more than 40 % of cumulative growth in us industrial production from 2009-2019 (Yergin, 
2020). Cheap shale gas made heating and electricity very affordable in international 
comparison (EIA, 2020a), which was beneficial for consumers and foreign investment into the 
US, such as manufacturing or chemical production. It added jobs and prosperity (Porter et al., 
2015; Solarin & Bello, 2020; Weber, 2012), often in regions that lacked those (e.g., the 
Appalachian or the Bakken shale). Although, local economic benefits are often smaller than 
expected (Bilgili et al., 2020; Kinnaman, 2011). The links between local GDP developments 
and their impact vary, depending on the region and its development history (Bilgili et al., 2020). 
Conditions and influences in the Texas Permian are fundamentally different in comparison to 
South Dakota’s Bakken. Drops in housing prices next to fracturing sites (Keeler & Stephens, 
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2020) and the collapse of local infrastructure in shale boom areas (Scholl, 2019) demonstrate 
some of the downsides. The societal and environmental license discussed in 2.6 displays an 
immense political factor. Political and regulatory statutes have the potential to shut down the 
entire industry as seen in the state of New York who banned such activities entirely. NIMBY 
(Not In My Backyard) attitudes and environmental protests seek to address the political 
rejection of shale (Dahl, 2015).  
The most significant impact on the regulatory and political side will certainly be exerted 
through government change after the 2020 US presidential election. While a stable policy 
environment is crucial for the industry's wellbeing (Scholl, 2019), many industry executives 
already expressed their concerns about a Biden administration tightening regulations for the 
industry (Dallas Fed, 2020). It is already clear that Biden promised to ban fracking on federal 
land, although that applies to little above 10% of the overall fracking activities. Other than that, 
not much is known yet. While Covid-19 has considerably impacted the election outcome (Pew 
Research Center, 2020), it is relatively uncertain which policies the new administration will 
adopt when it comes to the energy sector. A lot also depends on the results of the special 
elections for the US senate held in Georgia by the beginning of 2021. A Biden administration 
with a majority in Congress would have substantially more impact (probably a more restrictive 
one) on the US shale industry than an administration governing through executive orders or 
other more uncommon instruments like fiscal measures through a Treasury Department under 
Janet Yellen. That effect could even be fostered by increasing pressure from progressive forces 
within the party to tighten policies in the event of a congress majority than without one. Being 
under pressure to fulfill the stark climate policy promise made throughout his campaign, and 
with a vice-president from fracking-detracting California, especially methane regulations could 
be tightened. Central federal agencies like EPA will probably revert the direction taken under 
the previous administration and even will probably even surpass Obama-era undertakings. On 
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the other hand, Biden himself is rather a centrist and is aware of the predominant role US shale 
has for the country’s energy system right now – in particular when it comes to foreign policy 
issues. The current status of energy independence and diplomatic power through oil & gas 
exports is a valuable asset which only reluctantly will be given up. Time will prove the 
considerations made here while their possible impact ranges from little to substantially – based 
on the proposed future path of the new administration.  
2.6. Environmental and societal sustainability – Social license  
The environmental and societal hazards of hydraulic fracturing have been covered 
extensively. On the one hand, systemic environmental risks (Kargbo et al., 2010; Meng, 2017; 
Wang et al., 2014) include groundwater pollution (Jiang et al., 2011; Osborn et al., 2011; 
Schmidt, 2011), wastewater issues (Sun et al., 2019), risk to biodiversity for specific species 
(Kiviat, 2013), and seismic activities (Brudzinski & Kozłowska, 2019; Villa & Singh, 2020). 
Moreover, risks for human health can occur (Colborn et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2011). Natural gas 
emissions are fueling climate change, particularly through methane emissions (Gunsch et al., 
2019; Stephenson et al., 2011). Depending on the magnitude of methane leaks, its carbon 
footprint can even be worse than that of other fossils (Alvarez et al., 2018; Howarth, 2019) and 
needs huge improvements to compete on a sustainable level (Cooper et al., 2018). Those efforts 
are not materializing yet (IEA, 2020b). On the other hand, groundwater pollution is less of a 
problem than wastewater disposal, and seismic activities can be mitigated if managed properly 
(IEA, 2012; Raimi, 2017; Sun et al., 2019). As the EPA ( 2016) highlights, the conditions for 
different hazards can vary substantially, and the impacts of shale activities can hardly be 
generalized (Habrich-Böcker et al., 2015; Mason et al., 2015). Also, if appropriately covered, 
natural gas’ carbon footprint is only half of that of coal and a third less than oil (IPCC, 2014), 
which is why the rise of the US shale industry is responsible for the country’s emission 
reductions of the last decade (IEA, 2019).  
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Protests and political opposition against new hydrocarbon projects increased in recent years 
and examples like the Keystone XL pipeline proved that the social license for such projects 
cannot always be taken for granted anymore. Movements like “Friday´s for Future” or the 
“Sunrise Movement” were able to mobilize thousands and to create increased pressure on 
policy makers. The ban of fracking activities in states such as New York and partly California 
has shown that such policies have the potential to comprehensively obstruct shale activities. 
But also in regions more favorable towards shale, expanding regulations (such as banning 
fracking close to schools in Colorado) make operations more complex. 
Multiple scholars have emphasized that for shale’s future prosperity, it’s societal and 
environmental license is decisive (Marlin-Tackie & Smith, 2020; Wang et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, the past decade seems to have proven the contrary for various reasons. While the 
discussed hazards only partly have been mitigated, the US shale output grew consistently (IEA, 
2019). None of these externalities are priced (Mason et al., 2015). Despite their presence, 
negative externalities require a very high “burden of proof” and fracking’s unpriced social costs 
are mainly local in nature, while benefits are local, but also national and global (Mason et al., 
2015). There is little reason to expect that Covid-19 reverts this trend. Environmental, Social, 
and Governance (ESG) goals have certainly increased costs for companies, and indeed some – 
even majors - are struggling with these expenses. Although, it is not entirely consequential why 
the pandemic would extent the urgency of that aspect. Instead, in times of crisis and economic 
downturn, many voters and citizens prioritize employment over environmental issues and 
prioritize sustainability issues to a lesser degree (Abou-Chadi & Kayser, 2017; Kenny, 2020; 
Singer, 2011). Therefore, although the pandemic offers the chance for societally and 
environmentally progressive policies (Bodenheimer & Leidenberger, 2020; Helm, 2020), it 
remains doubtful whether Covid-19 will impact the sustainable license. 
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3. Methods 
The following section discusses the methodology applied to generate the data set for this 
research. Limitations, which are partly based on the characteristics of the methods, are 
examined under section 4 “results.”.  
3.1. Expert Panel 
Great rigor was put into selecting an adequate, nonprobability, and constructivist expert 
panel, which would be particularly proficient with the topic and represent the full diversity and 
variety of perspectives eminent in the field (Kruse, 2015). The panel chosen displays an 
outstanding amount of expertise and unites some senior figures of the target groups. To build 
this partial census panel, the quota sampling method was applied by segmenting the target 
population into five fields: Academia/ Research, Industry, Think Tanks, Journalism/ 
Publishing, and Government/ Public. Multiple strategies, many suggested by Hepburn, 
O’Callaghan, Stern, Stiglitz, & Zenghelis (2020), were applied to select such a panel. In 
particular, academics and think tank employees were identified by relevant publications 
proposed by Drupp, Freeman, Groom, & Nesje (2018). For the latter, the 2019 Global Go To 
Think Tank Index Report (McGann, 2020) in the categories “environmental” as well as “energy 
and resources” was consulted. Conference attendants of occasions such as OSEA or LNG2019 
were filtered as introduced by Necker (2014) to identify industry experts. The author’s 
professional network and personal contacts were also used as inferred by Nordhaus (1994). For 
journalists and publishers, relevant publications and information providers such as the Wall 
Street Journal, the New York Times, or Bloomberg were scanned. Manual, comprehensive 
web-based search merged these approaches. 
Since the panel is a highly qualified one, the number of participants is not as crucial to 
ensure data validity as in, e.g., consumer panels (Kruse, 2015). Nevertheless, a sample size of 
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one hundred was the aspired minimum target. Assuming a feedback ratio of around 33% 
(Stedman et al., 2019) and an error margin of around 10% (e.g., for spelling errors, mails sent 
to junk folders or outdated addresses, etc.), 400 persons were contacted initially.  
3.2. Contact  
To ensure sufficient response rates, the principles of Dillman, Smyth, & Christian  
(2014) laid out the foundation of designing the medium of contact (e-mail) and planning the 
approaching process. Moreover, following rationales were taken into account to ensure valid 
response rates. Based on Groves (2006) and Callegaro (2014), the individual benefit for 
participation was outlined: To gain knowledgeable insights during a period of uncertainty in a 
field of high familiarity. The sequential mixed mode (start the approach by e-mail and then 
offer a web-based questionnaire), which was applied here, offers increased response rates 
compared to traditional mail surveys (Kaplowitz et al., 2004; Medway & Fulton, 2012). The 
message design attempted a framing as individual as possible (Stedman et al., 2019). This 
included each recipient’s name, title, occupation/ place of work, and recent accomplishments 
in the field such as publications, if applicable. Johns Hopkins university was highlighted since 
legitimate organizations increase response rates (Groves, 2006). Survey length and message 
length were kept as short as feasible ( 3-4 minutes, 11 questions; 5 lines with a FAQ below) 
and as self-explanatory as possible (Conelly et al., 2003). An emotional signaling was added 
(“Do you remember when you were a student?”), and the survey petitioner was lifted out of 
anonymity by offering contact details and a short CV (Trentelman et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
ambassadors were utilized to introduce or pass on the questionnaire to colleagues. The survey 
was conducted between October 20 and November 12, 2020, with three rounds of messages 
going out to the panel (1 initial and two sets of reminders), which can be found under Appendix 
B. The detailed questionnaire can be found under Appendix A. Strict anonymity was granted 
to all participants unless they decided to leave their contact details at the end of the evaluation. 
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That was not only relevant to increase response rates but also to avoid Common Method 
Variance (CMV) (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
3.3. Survey Design & Analysis 
The cross-sectional expert survey design was based on the work of Bradburn, Sudman, 
& Wansink (2004) and Diamond (2011) and aimed at collecting a sufficient amount of primary 
data. The response options were mainly ordinal (with some being nominal), evaluative, and in 
most cases utilized a Likert scale. An exhaustive item selection to optimize the Likert scale 
selectivity (Greeving, 2009) was not conducted due to insufficient access to the test population. 
The online survey done through “Survey Monkey” asked to subjectively assess four central 
fields of questions: Which main factors are decisive for the future of the US shale industry 
post-Covid-19 (Q. 1-3)? How do those factors influence the industry (Q. 4)? What (normative) 
impact will these factors have on the industry recovery post-Covid-19 (Q. 5)? What is a realistic 
future scenario for the industry (Q. 7-10)? In the end, it also evaluated the background of the 
survey-takers (Q. 11-12).  
The results will be displayed in the shape of tables and diagrams where applicable. With 
regards to the empirical computations, mainly central tendency (Mode, Median, Mean) as well 
as spread (Interquartile Range, Standard Deviation) will be conducted. In some cases, a 
bivariate analysis will be added. Most variables are to be considered ordinal (those of the Likert 
scales). One exemption displays the first question with including a Likert scale range from 1 
to 10 and therefore can be considered continuous (Kampen & Swyngedouw, 2000) for 
calculations of central tendency. For the benefit of improved comparability, the Likert scales 
from 1-5 in Q. 4-5 are adapted to a 1-10 scale in the graphics.   
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4. Results 
Of those 360 experts contacted, 89 eventually responded. After eliminating incomplete data 
sets (“Complete Case Analysis”), 83 respondents providing roughly 1,900 data points 
remained. Further, 63 comments in free space fields were counted. In the following, a closer 
look into two sections will be conducted: The main drivers impacting the future of US shale 
(Q. 1-6) and the industry outlook (Q. 7-9). Both are combined with the respondents’ 
backgrounds (Q. 10-11). The section concludes with a debate about research limitations. The 
detailed results can be found in Appendix C.  
4.1. The six central drivers 
In terms of importance, the central drivers can be segmented into three groups. First, 
the expert panel agrees that commodity prices for both oil & gas are the single most important 
factor, with more than two thirds (71%) rating it as a 9 or 10 out of 10 (M = 8.82, SD = 1.73) 
with ten being the highest. The second group consists of the drivers BE (M = 7.67, SD = 2.35), 
industry constraints (M =7.04, SD = 1.95) and demand (M = 7.10, SD = 2.47). They are 
considered as rather decisive. Demand development displays the leading driver, although the 
spread is somewhat higher than for the first group. Even though global demand and commodity 
prices are highly interconnected and depend on each other,  the experts consider the latter as 
the more dominant one in this dyad. The least important drivers seem to be political (M =5.07, 
SD = 2.08) and social & environmental (M =5.06, SD = 2.11), both being valued 5 out of 10 
on average. A similar picture can be seen when it comes to Covid-19 influencing these drivers. 
The panel seems to agree that commodity prices (Mdn =4.00, IQR = 1.00), as well as demand 
(Mdn =4.00, IQR = 1.00), also are the ones which are shaped “a great deal” by the pandemic. 
Industry constraints (Mdn =3.00, IQR = 1.00), as well as political factors (Mdn =3.00, IQR = 
1.00), are shaped “a lot” by Covid-19 while BE (Mdn =2.00, IQR = 1.00) and environmental 
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& social drivers only are considered to be impacted “a little” on average. Again, a separation 
into three groups can be observed here, while the macro-economic factors of demand and prices 
recurrently lead the field in terms of impact. Regarding that impact on the industry recovery 
being either positive or negative, naturals gas & crude oil prices are considered to affect the 
post-Covid-19 recovery “very positively” even though the spread of opinions is the starkest 
here (Mdn 5.00, IQR = 3.00). The same assessment but less distinct can be noted for the 
demand, which on average is thought of to have a “positive” impact with a considerable spread 
still apparent (Mdn 4.00, IQR = 2.00). “Neutral” influence is exerted by the drivers BE (Mdn 
3.00, IQR = 1.00), political (Mdn =3.00, IQR = 1.00) and social & environmental (Mdn 3.00, 
IQR = 1.00), while industry constraints have a “negative” impact (Mdn 2.00, IQR = 1.00). 
Figure 3 visualizes these events, while Table 1 summarizes the overall empirical results.  
 
Figure 3  - Measures of Central Tendency for the six core drivers (Q. 1-5) - Mean/Median 
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Even though bivariate analyses for a sample size n<100 should only be executed with 
great caution, for Q. 1 - Q. 5 where n=83, some observations will be made in the following. 
While for the vast majority of the data set variables only insignificant results are discovered, a 
few stand out. Table 2 highlights these events. There is a moderate positive relationship 
between the BE Covid-19 impact (Q. 4) and the BE impact on recovery (Q. 5) with φ = .524 
and χ2 (16, N= 83) = 22.084; p < .005 as well as for natural gas & crude oil prices (Q. 4) and 
Global demand (Q. 5) with φ = .713 and χ2 (16, N= 83) = 42.163; p < .005. The same moderate 
relation applies for political factors (Q. 4) and social/ environmental license (Q. 5) with φ = 
.781 and χ2 (25, N= 83) = 50.620; p < .005 and social/ environmental license (Q. 4) to social/ 
environmental license (Q. 5) with φ = .772 and χ2 (25, N= 83) = 49.563; p < .005. When it 
comes to the question of the influence of industry constraints on the US shale industry (Q. 1) 
and the panel background, a modest relationship is found with 3-22 φ = .481 and χ2 (35, N= 
83) = 69.694; p < .005. Indeed, those experts associated with “industry” and “think tanks/ 
NGOs” rate the driver as the second most influential one after price development by slight .35 
respectively .68 points above the overall average. These groups are probably the most 
knowledgeable and profound regarding this driver. On the other hand, that driver is rated as 
the overall second most influential one anyway. A very strong relationship can be found 
between the impact of political factors (Q. 1) and background where φ = 1.032 and χ2 (40, N= 
83) = 88.451; p < .005. The maximum value is attributed by “Public/ Government with .83 
points above the mean, while the minimum comes from “Industry” with .40 points below the 
mean. Between the variables background and BE ( Q. 4) exists a strong relationship with φ = 
.856  and χ2 (25, N= 83) = 60.821; p < .005 respectively a moderate relationship (Q. 5) with φ 
= .691 and χ2 (15, N= 83) = 39.536; p < .005. No outstanding observations can be made for 
these connections. Last but not least, global demand (Q. 5) has a significant relationship with 
all other variables covered. Reflecting on the associations presented so far as well as the 
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tendencies summarized in Figure 3, the following assumption seems plausible: Those drivers 
who are considered to shape the future of the US shale industry the most also are the ones 
which are affected the greatest by Covid-19 while those are also expected to shape the industry 
recovery the in a positive way – and vice versa. 
 
Table 1 - Empirical survey results summarized 
  
 
Q. 1  Drivers Prices BE Constraints Demand Political License Q. 6- US Election Absoute Relative
1 - not at all 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 - not at all 5 6%
2 1 5 0 5 4 1 2 28 34%
3 0 1 1 6 12 17 3 29 35%
4 2 2 11 3 5 19 4 15 18%
5 1 5 9 6 19 14 5 - a great deal 6 7%
6 1 6 10 6 18 6 Median 3,00
7 3 9 16 21 7 11 Mode 3,00
8 13 14 14 9 8 4 IQR 1,50
9 25 21 12 6 7 7 Q. 7 Shale future Absoute Relative
10 - a great deal 36 19 10 21 3 1 1 - Pessimistic 12 14%
Mean 8,82 7,67 7,04 7,10 5,70 5,06 2 - Neutral 48 58%
Mode 10,00 9,00 7,00 10,00 5,00 4,00 3 - Optimistic 23 28%
Standard Deviation 1,73 2,35 1,95 2,47 2,08 2,11 Median 2,00
Q. 4 Driver Impact Prices BE Constraints Demand Political License Mode 2,00
1 - not at all 4 11 4 0 11 18 IQR 1,00
2 4 37 15 5 29 32 Q. 8 - Recovery Pre-Covid? Absoute Relative
3 5 14 29 14 32 19 1 - No 26 31%
4 31 14 24 28 8 10 2 -Uncertain 19 23%
5 - a great deal 39 5 10 35 2 3 3 - Yes 38 46%
Median 4,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 3,00 2,00 Median 2,00
Mode 5,00 2,00 3,00 5,00 3,00 2,00 Mode 3,00
Interquartile Range 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 IQR 2,00
Q. 10 Background Absoute Relative
Journalism/ Publishing 7 8%
Q. 5 Driver normative Prices BE Constraints Demand Political License Academia/ Research 30 36%
1 - very negative 5 0 4 1 2 3 Industry 20 24%
2 - negative 18 8 42 27 30 35 Think Tank / NGO 9 11%
3 - neutral 15 36 24 11 40 30 Public/ Government 7 8%
4 - positive 0 30 10 30 8 11 Other 10 12%
5 - very positive 45 9 2 14 3 3 Q. 11 - Time in Industry Absoute Relative
Median 5,00 3,00 2,00 4,00 3,00 3,00 0-5 years 21 25%
Mode 5,00 3,00 2,00 4,00 3,00 2,00 5-10 years 35 56%
Interquartile Range 3,00 1,00 1,00 2,00 1,00 1,00 10+ years 27 100%
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Table 2 - Bivariate Analyses: Cross-tabulation & the chi-square overview for all significant 
relationships of the data set 
  
 
When it comes to the 2020 US election's influence, the panel rates its importance as 
being moderate with a tendency to only be of little importance (Mdn 3.00, IQR = 1.50). Even 
though, it must be mentioned that only six responses (7%) were collected after the election date 
of November 3, when it became clear or foreseeable that a change in government would take 
place.  
4.2. US shale Outlook  
When it comes to the industry outlook, most panel members are neutral (53%), although 
slightly more than a quarter (28%) project a positive future scenario. While these shares do 
roughly align for the “Industry” group, they are slightly different for “Academia/ Research”, 
which displays the largest group of respondents. Within this segment, almost half (47%) 
consider a neutral scenario, but also the share of those expecting a positive future is way higher 
(40%). Similarly, the segment of “Public/ Government” draws a relatively positive picture: 
Substantially more than half of the experts from that field consider the outcomes as “positive 
“(57%) or at least neutral. Generally, almost half of the experts (47%) expect the US shale 
industry to recover to pre-Covid-19 levels while around a quarter (23%) are neutral, and a third 
deny such a recovery (31%). Similar numbers can be seen again for the “Public/ Government” 
segment, which makes both groups the more optimistic ones. The groups that present the most 
Variable 1 Variable 2 φ relationship χ
2
p-value
BE Q. 4 (Variable 8) BE Q. 5 (Variable 14) .524 moderate (16, N= 83) = 22.084 < .005
Commodity Prices Q. 4 (Variable 7) Global demand Q. 5 (Variable 16) .713 moderate (16, N= 83) = 42.163 < .005
Political factors Q. 4 (Variable 11) Social/ environmental license Q.  5 (Variable 18) .781 moderate (25, N= 83) = 50.620 < .005
Social/ environmental license Q. 4 (Variable 12) Social/ environmental license Q. 5 (Variable 18) .772 moderate (25, N= 83) = 49.563 < .005
BE Q. 5 (Variable 14) Recovery Outlook (Variable 21) .481 modest (6, N= 83) = 19.224 < .005
Industry Constraints Q.1 (Variable 3) Background (Variable 22) .481 modest (35, N= 83) = 69.694 < .005
Political factors Q.1 (Variable 5) Background (Variable 22) 1.032 very strong (40, N= 83) = 88.451 < .005
BE Q. 4 (Variable 8) Background (Variable 22) .856 strong (25, N= 83) = 60.821 < .005
BE Q. 5 (Variable 14) Background (Variable 22) .691 moderate (15, N= 83) = 39.536 < .005
Recovery Outlook (Variable 21) Experience (Variable 23) .508 moderate (4, N= 83) = 21.383 < .005
Global Demand Q. 5 (Variable 16) All other variables < .005
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positive future assessments were “Public/ Government” with 10+ years of industry experience 
and “Academia/ Research” with 5-10 years of experience. Vice versa, the most negative ones 
are experts from “Think Tanks/ NGOs” with 10+ years as well as “Industry” professionals with 
0-5 years. Figure 4 gives an overview of these connections.  
In terms of bivariate analyses, a modest relationship can be noted between the BE 
impact on recovery (Q. 5) and the recovery outlook with φ = .481 and χ2 (6, N=83) = 19.224; 
p < .005. Another, moderate, relation can be observed between the panel background and the 
question about shale recovery. While two thirds (67%) of those with the least experience in the 
industry say that the industry will recover, only one in ten (11%) of those with 10+ years of 
experience do so. In that group, almost half (48%) think that a recovery to pre-Covid-19 levels 
will not occur. 
 
Figure 4 -  Frequency distribution of US shale outlook (Q. 7-8) in contrast to panel 
backgrounds (Q. 10- 11) 
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4.3. Repercussion on the hypotheses 
4.3.1. Hypothesis 1  
Those drivers influencing the industry's future the most as well are the ones being 
affected the most by Covid-19. Segmenting into three groups as suggested, the two most 
influential drivers of oil & natural gas prices and demand (M 8.00, SD = 2.1) are considered 
to be shaped “a lot” by the industry (Mdn 4.00, SD = 1) but also are considered to have a 
positive influence on the recovery of the industry (Mdn 4.5, SD = 2). Although it should be 
mentioned that keeping in mind a comparably high spread, opinions seem to diverge slightly. 
Most drivers are expected to shape the industry by a “moderate” amount while their 
normative impact is predominantly considered “neutral”. Also, the majority of the panel 
(58%) is neutral about the future of the industry while almost a third is rather optimistic 
(28%). The preceding result description highlighted that the results are interconnected and 
often dependent on the background of the panel takers. The results do not point in one 
direction or another. Nevertheless, choosing between the Hypothesis H1 and the Null-
Hypothesis H0, the impacts of Covid-19 are not precisely negative but rather depend on 
single drivers and could therefore constitute in a different direction. Incorporating the 
criticism of picking one of both options (Biemann, 2009), H0 seems more reasonable.   
4.3.2. Hypothesis 2 
The observations discussed for Hypothesis 1 are also partly applicable to Hypothesis 2. 
Most relevant drivers do not point in a direction that would draw a necessarily pessimistic 
future scenario for the US shale industry. Turning to Q. 8, almost half of the experts state they 
expect a recovery to pre-Covid-19 levels (47%) while roughly a quarter is uncertain about that 
(23%), leaving those not expecting a recovery to 2019 levels as the minority. A biased panel 
(further discussed in section 4.4) might apply but is only in parts responsible for these result’s 
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overall message of. For Hypothesis 2, it seems to be even more apparent that H0 is the more 
applicable option to apply: 2019 was an all-time industry high, which could be reached again.  
4.4. Limitations 
Since the survey was designed to optimize response rates, it did not allow an in-depth 
assessment of single parameters. Although blank fields enabled the participants to specify their 
evaluation and to add comments, the strict design might have fostered generalization at some 
points. A key area where more in depth evaluation would have been helpful is the time horizon 
of the driver implications. Furthermore, the background of the target population assessed does 
not have the same balanced split of the target population contacted. The panel which 
participated in the study is mainly originated within Academia/ Research (38%) or the Industry 
(25%). That could have translated into response biases (Diamond, 2011; Stedman et al., 2019) 
based on the corresponding professional perspective. And even within one field, opinions 
certainly divert. Both investors and operators would probably identify themselves with the field 
“Industry” but naturally have diverging points of view. 
The selection process certainly did not involve or even identify all relevant experts in 
the field, particularly for those not located in the US. An exhaustive representation of all 
opinions eminent might be limited by that element and incorporate “single source biases”. 
Although the analysis conducted in section 4.2 does not necessarily support such an objection. 
Research fatigue is an issue that leads to lower survey outputs and lower response quality 
(Walsh et al., 2020). Especially in times of high uncertainty as during the Covid-19 pandemic 
and while the test population is exposed to frequent polls (such as the Dallas Fed Oil & Gas 
Survey), this is a threat to research. The return rate of this assessment, which turned out lower 
as intended, highlights that issue. Reliability and generalizability might be affected by these 
factors. Finally, the bivariate analysis completed through cross-tabulation and the chi-square 
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test in this work offers some points of uncertainty. As noted before, the target population is too 
small to compute in-depth empirical research. Looking at the results, some appear meaningful 
and fit the picture drawn by the dissimilar results (e.g., the relationship between variable 3 and 
22 industry constrains and background, or between variable 7 and 16 commodity prices and 
global demand). Others, like the correlation of variable 16 global demand, question the overall 
(construct) validity of that measurement tool. Therefore, these outcomes can only be taken as 
an indicator and not as significant effects shaping the result considerations.  
5. Discussion 
Through the course of the last section, it became clear that the quantitative analysis in the 
shape of an expert survey resulted in a different assessment on the impact of Covid-19 and its 
impact on the US shale industry than the preceding literature review. The proposed hypotheses 
formed by the literature review were rather rejected than confirmed. The overall outlook for 
the industry looks rather promising than doubtful. Although, noticing a relatively high spread 
throughout the data set, it also became clear that opinions diverted. Moreover, the time horizon 
of these developments was not covered in great depth. It remains unclear if a possible recovery 
to pre-crisis levels will take place in a more medium or long-term scenario. The expert 
background mattered in some instances like the assessment of the political driver and the 
limitations discussed in section 4.4 highlight the necessity to interpret these outcomes with 
greatest caution. The drivers examined are all interconnected and influence each other, the best 
example are prices and demand. Isolated analyses of single factors will necessarily distort the 
image and lead to wrong conclusions. Uncertainty about the short-medium term future is a 
reoccurring pattern. Single, unforeseeable developments might result in entirely different 
scenarios that neglect all discussions held in this paper. However, the following considerations 
are worth taking into account. 
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It became clear throughout this study that most relevant drivers are substantially shaped by 
the development of the Covid-19 pandemic and its repercussions on the global economy. 
Although the pandemic's advance displays a first layer of uncertainty, it seems that after a 
second partial lockdown in late fall 2020 and with vaccinations to be started by the end of 2020, 
2021 could become the year in which the disease will be at least contained. However, multiple 
scenarios for economic recovery can be expected. The IMF (2020) expects marginalized 
growth in 2021 and an arduous recovery in the long-term. Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, & 
Ursúa (2013) have highlighted that looking at all large economic crises, historically, it took 6-
7 years on average to return to pre-crisis levels. For the major banking crises that have occurred 
in the last 150 years, the median amount of time was 6.5 years (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). 
Economic shocks are not just temporary disruptions but can have meaningful and lasting 
impacts on economic performance (Cerra & Saxena, 2008; Larsen et al., 2020). Looking at the 
finance industry after 2008, it also becomes clear what transformative potential such a crisis 
can have on an industry. Although for the case of hydrocarbons, demand will recover, the 
current crisis will not withdraw without leaving its marks.  
When it comes to the driver natural gas and oil prices, it is amongst the most important or 
even the single most crucial factor for the industry's future. Both the literature and this study 
agree that the impact of Covid-19 on prices is significant (Sharif et al., 2020). Also, it is deeply 
bound to the question of global demand development. Increasing demand essentially results in 
increasing prices if the supply does not expand at the same rate and disturbs that interplay. 
Both are closely directed by the economic recovery scenario of whatever shape (L, V, W curve) 
eventually taking place (Larsen et al., 2020). More than the overall recovery, particularly 
rebound in specific industries, predominantly transportation, will decide about demand and 
prices.  
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Although not being the primary driver influencing the industry, industry constraints 
continue to be relevant. The discussion has not changed much for the last decade (Gao & You, 
2017; Wang et al., 2014), but the pandemic has tightened the margin for error here. While 
investor money is becoming scarcer, and the focus shifts more to profits and capital discipline 
focusing on growth, capital requirements keep being high. Many companies struggle as a 
result– not just medium-sized companies but also IOCs active in the shale business. The trend 
towards bankruptcies and industry consolidation is likely to proceed. Especially smaller 
companies less capable of surviving times of financial hardship are attractive short-cycle 
acquisition targets. Also, companies will continue to lower BE costs (Rystad Energy, 2020). 
Technical solutions like refracturing will be key to moving forward (Kong, Ostadhassan, 
Tamimi, Samani, & Li, 2019), although the innovation path curve effect makes technological 
progress less impactful but more expensive. That threatens future competitiveness. Being one 
of the industry’s biggest pain points, this study also highlights that industry constraints are 
probably the most negative influence on the industry’s future.  
The political and environmental/ social license drivers seem to be interconnected, which is 
logical in the context of policy fields influencing policymakers and rulemaking. It is 
particularly interesting to see that the political aspect and in particular the outcome of the 2020 
US presidential elections are not expected to have a decisive influence on the industry in this 
assessment. Other evaluations, like the Dallas Fed Energy Survey (Dallas Fed, 2020), take that 
into account by valuing the political factor more prominently. A reason why this study comes 
to a different conclusion might be that the new administration has not announced concrete 
policies which substantially affect the industry. Another motive might be that the shale industry 
can be considered as so incrementally important for the US in multiple ways that it is unlikely 
that too punitive policies would be introduced anytime soon. It needs to be highlighted that 
some of the factors discussed in 2.5 have the potential to be disruptive. The often discussed 
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repercussions of the social/ environmental license have not yet materialized to shake the 
industry, and the results of this study do not support any different interpretation. For both 
drivers, it is important to note what Sovacool (2014) underlined: “The pursuit and utilization 
of shale gas presents policymakers, planners, and investors with a series of pernicious tradeoffs 
and tough choices”. It seems that this balancing act has been managed satisfyingly for the 
greatest part in the past since no regulations or policies have fundamentally opposed the 
industry yet. Many shale threats have been mitigated by rulebook in the last decade (IEA, 
2012).  
This paper discussed the plunge of oil prices by the beginning of 2020 and Saudi Arabia ‘s 
and Russia’s involvement. While neither of their economies, like the US shale industry, can 
survive at very low prices for an extended time (Sabitova & Shavaleyeva, 2015), it also made 
another issue quite visible: Another layer of uncertainty is added whether a major conflict will 
occur that could dramatically change the stability of world oil markets or not (Jefferson, 2020). 
Generally spoken, the cause of the current particular downturn is quite unique, but shocks to 
the market are not. 2020 displayed the third major price collapse in 12 years. Generally, 
commodity markets are a cyclical business: Oil markets will stay volatile (Michaux, 2019). 
After the last two price shocks, US shale has proven to be remarkably resilient (especially in 
the Permian), and its rebound set US production on the top. 
While valid arguments can be offered in favor and against the future of the industry, the 
experts asked throughout this study are rather restrained about its future: Most think “neutrally” 
about it. Although, different to, e.g. the Dallas Fed Oil & Gas survey, the biggest group expects 
a recovery to pre-Covid-10 levels. Although, a recovery to pre-Covid-10 levels does not 
necessarily mean equal growth trajectories as prior to the pandemic. Still, it is a reasonable 
opinion in a world that still covers around 80% of its energy demand (IEA, 2020b) with fossil 
fuels and therefore depends on US exports, which are gained from shale formations for the 
 
  32 
greatest parts. Shale has gained its place in the energy landscape and is unlikely to vanish soon. 
Some even say that fracked natural gas has the potential to become the world’s primary energy 
source (Kan et al., 2020; Liew et al., 2020). While there lies truth in this statement for gas, it 
is less valid for oil. It is under pressure especially due to a transforming transportation sector 
and its shifting focus to EVs. Leveraged Costs of Energy (LCOE) for renewables are 
increasingly competitive (EIA, 2020a) and compete against fossils in sectors such as heating, 
power generation and partly transportation (Ram et al., 2018). The low carbon transition gains 
traction, and today’s energy landscape is unimaginable without the link to its emissions. 
Therefore, gas might face the same situation in thirty years as oil does in the next decade. The 
current pandemic may even accelerate the energy transition and decarbonization. Some 
scholars underlined that “Green Stimulus” after the crisis would add more economic growth 
than traditional measures (Hepburn et al., 2020).  
6. Conclusion 
This study focused on six central drivers to evaluate the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic impact 
for the US shale industry. These were: First, crude oil and natural gas prices. Second, Break-
Even (BE) prices for fracking operations. Third, financial and technical constraints within the 
industry (e.g., debt ratios, capital spending, competition). Fourth, global hydrocarbon demand 
development. Fifth, political and regulatory factors in the US. Sixth, environmental and societal 
sustainability. While prices and demand seem to be the most impactful ones, it needs to be 
highlighted that these drivers are highly interconnected and exert influence between each other. 
Isolated analyses of single drivers will almost necessarily lead to wrong conclusions. The 
expert survey seems to agree that the more impactful the drivers are, the more they seem to be 
shaped by Covid-19 – and the more those influence the future of the industry positively. 
Although, it also has to be mentioned that opinions sometimes divert, and the partly insufficient 
database makes the results not always reliable. That leads the quantitative results of this work 
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to give some valuable insights and directions but should not be considered the single truth. In 
the literature review as well as in the quantitative part, uncertainty runs like a golden thread 
through the analyses. Especially the literature review highlights the multiple factors influencing 
each driver which makes a projection about the future of the US shale industry a highly 
complex maneuver. While some mega-trends proceed (e.g., energy transition, energy demand 
growth, low-carbon-economy), the pandemic displays an unprecedented crisis with parameters 
almost impossible to foresee. While the experts in this study are fairly optimistic that the 
industry will recover to pre-Covid-19 levels, the general outlook for the future is a little bit less 
optimistic. Also, gas is advantaged in comparison to oil. As the EIA (2020a) underlines, energy 
market projections are always subject to much uncertainty because the various elements that 
shape markets, as well as future advances in technologies, demographics, and resources, cannot 
be projected with certainty.  That is even more true for the current situation. Nevertheless, this 
work aims to  pull its weight to understand better what a possible future of the US shale industry 
could look like. A future, that is highly uncertain but within certain boundaries will probably 
favor the US shale industry.  
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Appendix C 
Summarized, detailed response data from the expert survey.  
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